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Synopsis —
 
To the foreign observer, Turkish women constitute an anomaly amongst Muslim societies.
Since the creation of the Turkish Republic in 1923, Turkey has engaged in a project of modernization
and secularization. As part and parcel of this process of modernization, Turkish women have been
granted social, political, and legal rights. Despite Kemalist reforms of the 1920s, the basics of male dom-
ination stayed intact. It is this paradoxical character of Kemalist reforms that this article emphasises.
The legal equality granted to Turkish women did not succeed in their emancipation. The image of Tur-
key as the only modern, secular, democratic country in the Islamic Middle East has been an effective
distortion, concealing many truths about Turkey. The author proposes that the Mediterranean culture,
the Islamist traditions, and the Kemalist ideology act together in perpetuating the oppression of women
in Turkey and keep patriarchy intact. © 1999 Elsevier Science Ltd. All rights reserved.
 
To many students of Turkish society and poli-
tics, the status of Turkish women is a puzzle.
Turkey is said to be the only modern, demo-
cratic, Islamic country, which makes it some-
what an anomaly among the Islamic world,
and the status of Turkish women visibly marks
this difference. The aim of this article is not so
much to focus on the struggle going on over
women in Turkey, but rather to look at the un-
derlying social dynamics of this struggle and
emphasise the paradoxical character of women’s
emancipation in Turkey. Since the creation of
the modern Turkish Republic (October 29,
1923), the ultimate aim for the modernisers
has been to gain acceptance for Turkey among
the European system of states (Berkes, 1964;
Lewis, 1961; Mardin, 1991). This objective is
best summarized by the Turkish Republic’s
founder, Mustafa Kemal Atatürk, as “our aim
is to elevate Turkey to the ranks of contempo-
rary civilizations” (Berkes, 1964). Turkish society
perceives the process of modernization as a
process of Europeanization, the adoption of
European norms, attitudes, and standards of
living (Mardin, 1991), and, therefore, Turkish
people reject traditional (i.e., non-European)
elements. It is within this context of modern-
ization and Europeanization that Turkish women
were granted certain rights, atypical for an Is-
lamic country.
When in 1923, Turkey made its bid towards
gaining acceptance as a European state in its
own right (Berkes, 1964; Müftüler-Bac, 1997),
one of the stumbling blocks on the way to
modernization was the oppression of women
in Turkey. As part and parcel of Turkey’s
modernization process embarked in 1923,
Turkish women were emancipated and Turkey
became the only Islamic country that granted
social, legal, and political rights to women
early in the 20th century. A few lucky women
who came from the highest socioeconomic
backgrounds in Turkey were chosen as the
leading “army.” This small, privileged group
was able to receive the same education as men
and compete with them under the same condi-
tions for jobs. Paradoxically, the presence of
an emancipated small group of women does
more harm to women in Turkey because it cre-
ates the illusion that Turkish women are not
subject to oppression as in other Islamic coun-
tries. In addition, the recognition of social and
political rights in Turkey well ahead of many
Western countries, “perhaps preempted the
emergence of a women’s movement” (Arat,
1989, p. 33).
Despite many rights Turkish women ac-
quired at least on paper, there still exist serious
obstacles to Turkish women’s liberation, and a
vast majority of Turkish women lack the op-
portunities to enjoy their rights as granted by
the Turkish legal system. A number of scholars
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claim that Turkish women are emancipated
but unliberated (Arat, 1989, 1994; Kandiyoti,
1987; Tekeli, 1995). Therefore, it seems con-
tradictory that despite modernization efforts
and legal changes, Turkish women are still op-
pressed by the patriarchal system.
On the surface, there seems to be a dichot-
omy between two types of women in Turkish
society: the open, Western, emancipated woman,
and the closed, traditional, “unliberated”
woman. A favorite sight for foreigners is the
Turkish girl in a miniskirt walking side by side
with her veiled sister. Whether the liberal,
Western-oriented woman or her traditional,
pious sister represents the majority of Turkish
women is the question in many minds. This ar-
ticle claims that the divide among Turkish
women is a reflection of the identity crisis or
the cultural dilemma that Turkish society has
been facing since the 19th century. This article
proposes that the perception that Turkey is the
only Islamic state where women are emanci-
pated is an illusion. There is a small, elite
group of educated, professional, Western-ori-
ented women in Turkey, the existence of
which contributes to the fallacy that Turkish
women are not chained by discriminatory
practices as in other Islamic countries, and that
they are in a much better position than their
Middle Eastern sisters. However, the seem-
ingly bright picture—that Turkey as the most
modern, democratic, secular Muslim state that
also secures woman’s rights—is misleading in
many ways. In fact, I propose that this percep-
tion is more harmful than outright oppression
because it shakes the ground for women’s
rights movements by suggesting that they are
unnecessary.
Women are oppressed in all countries from
the most modern to the most traditional, but to
varying degrees and in varying intensities.
They suffer from political, social, economic,
and legal inequalities as well as equality of op-
portunities. This article does not claim that the
problems Turkish women face are no longer
an issue in the West, on the contrary, despite
religious and cultural differences, Turkish
women share with women at large similar pat-
terns of oppression. In northwestern Europe,
women seem to be doing comparatively better
than Turkish women, however, many of the is-
sues raised in this article are still very much at
the core of women’s liberation movements in
the West. What sets the Turkish case apart is
the Turkish aspiration to be accepted as a Eu-
ropean country, and the way that the status of
Turkish women is used towards that end.
Thus, an illusion that Turkish women are
emancipated is essential to fulfil that aspira-
tion, and the projection of that image is found
to be more important than their actual emanci-
pation.
The status of women has been an issue of
much controversy in the process of Turkish
modernization. Whether to veil women or not,
and under what conditions to integrate them
into the public sphere, is one major axis
around which modernization efforts have re-
volved. When in the 19th century, moderniza-
tion efforts began in the Ottoman Empire, the
predecessor of the Turkish Republic, two op-
posing camps emerged in Turkish society; the
modernizing, secularizing, Western-oriented
elite and the traditional, Islamist, and reaction-
ary conservatives. Their struggle still continues
in modern Turkey, impacting political and so-
cial developments (Arat, 1989; Arsel, 1987;
Müftüler-Bac, 1997). The most visible line of
demarcation between these two opposing
camps is Turkish women. Interestingly, the
status of women became one important crite-
rion determining the extent and success of
modernization and Westernization efforts. The
emancipation of women became the barome-
ter of Turkish modernization, to the extent
that the reactionary groups of the anti-West-
ern social strata have fought the war against
Westernization on women’s bodies and dress.
Turkish women have suffered mostly from be-
ing “the focal point of intense debate among
groups with conflicting political interests,” but
what most groups agreed on was “the neces-
sary continuation of the patriarchal domina-
tion of men over women” (Tekeli, 1995, p. 10).
As part of the reform package enacted
upon the establishment of the Turkish Repub-
lic, women were granted social and political
rights, an analysis of which is provided in the
next section. Turkish women’s rights were
granted and promoted by the Kemalist elite,
mostly men; it was not achieved as a result of
women’s movements since, at the time, they
were nearly nonexistent. Women’s liberation
movements gained momentum in the 1980s as
educated, professional women began pushing
for modifications in the legal system and domi-
nant social norms. Thus, one explanation for
the relative weakness of women’s rights move-
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ments in modern Turkey is that under Kemal-
ism, a number of changes were made. At first
glance, Turkish legislation concerning gender
roles seems egalitarian, especially for an Is-
lamic country. In reality, Turkish legislation
reflects conventional gender ideology where
gender roles are constructed around “male
breadwinner-female homemaker” roles (Dun-
can, 1996, p. 419). The utmost duty for Turkish
women is to be good wives and mothers, basi-
cally because “the woman” is viewed as the
mechanism for protecting the cultural bound-
aries that set the community apart from other
societies (Bouhdiba, 1985; Moghadam, 1994).
The fact that Turkey is a Muslim society in-
creases the symbolic value of women as the
differentiating element between West and
non-West. For example, when women veil
themselves, they emphasize the physical differ-
ences between men and women, and, by doing
so, demarcate the boundary lines between Is-
lam and secular Western modernity. In this
manner, women become the guardians of tra-
dition and collective identity. It is for this rea-
son that Turkish women’s subordinate posi-
tion partly stems from their identity as the
social and biological carrier of the community
(Arat, 1989; Kagitçibasi, 1982; Kandiyoti,
1982).
 
AGENTS OF OPPRESSION IN TURKEY
 
What Turkish women share with their contem-
poraries in other societies is that women are
the “second sex” (de Beauvoir, 1953), and they
try to survive in a male constructed system
(Arat, 1989, 1994; Cindoglu, 1997). The image
of urban, middle-class, Turkish women is
pretty similar to “Western standards” in their
dress code, living standards, and political
rights. There are two problems in this picture,
first the proportion of Westernized Turkish
women is pretty small, and second, all Turkish
women are bound by the same gender roles
dominant in Turkish culture. Turkish women
face various forms of oppression and subordi-
nation in their daily lives; these can be catego-
rized under tangible and intangible forms of
oppression. The intangible ones include legal
discrimination, economic inequality, and social
inequality. The tangible ones comprise sexual
harassment, assault, insult, battering, rape, vir-
ginity tests, torture, and murder at the most
extreme. A preliminary list of the factors that
comprise patriarchy in Turkey would include:
the Mediterranean culture, Islam, and Kemal-
ism—the official state ideology.
 
The Mediterranean culture
 
The Mediterranean culture is the machismo
tradition that one can come across to varying
degrees in all Eastern Mediterranean societies.
In the Mediterranean region, it is claimed that
women are subject to oppression and exploita-
tion by all religious groups (Beck & Keddie,
1978; Delaney, 1987; Mernissi, 1975; Tillion,
1966), and there seems to be a set of family
laws common to the region that crosscuts na-
tional boundaries, with the possible exception
of France and Northern Italy. The Mediterra-
nean family structure is based on male superi-
ority and female inferiority,
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 which is repro-
duced by women themselves as mothers and
mothers-in-law. For example, a recent study
on sexuality in Turkey (
 
Report on Sexuality in
Turkey
 
, 1996) revealed that the most conserva-
tive group among those interviewed are older
(age group 50–59), married women with chil-
dren of their own. This group vehemently op-
posed such notions as premarital sex, single
women living on their own, extramarital af-
fairs; 94% of those women opposed such prac-
tices. These results suggest the importance of
women as transmitters and protectors of domi-
nant social values and norms. The culturally
defined modes of control in the Mediterranean
region are deeply vested in traditions and so-
cial norms constraining female behavior. Male
superiority is maintained through honor and
shame codes and women’s oppression is justi-
fied by society’s rules of appropriate behavior.
(Delaney, 1987; Peristiany, 1966, 1976). It is
said that “The Mediterranean woman, fre-
quently abused in spite of laws, sometimes
sold, often beaten, forced to work and whose
assassination may sometimes remain unpun-
ished is the slave of our modern times” (Til-
lion, 1966, pp. 161–178). Male supremacy in
the Mediterranean culture, endorsed by the
asymmetrical power relations between men
and women, in this manner acts as an agent of
oppression over women in Turkey. The Medi-
terranean culture, therefore, is a basis of male
dominance in Turkey, the pattern of which de-
pends on the “virginity-fidelity-son-producing
ethos” (Beck & Keddie, 1978, p. 25).
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Islam
 
The second factor is Islam, the dominant re-
ligion in Turkey where the majority of the
population, 99% is the official figure, is of
Muslim faith. Islam divides the world into two,
the public sphere that belongs to men, and the
private sphere, the domain of domesticity that
belongs to women. The two do not mix. Islam,
with its strict rules of confining women to the
private sphere, has traditionally incapacitated
women’s ability to receive education and to
hold jobs, in short to exist in the public sphere.
There are two competing views on how Islam
views women; there are those who claim that
equality between men and women is a basic
principle in the Koran, the separate-but-equal
argument (Hatemi, 1988). The proponents of
this view claim that women are already liber-
ated in Islam, therefore, there is no legitimate
ground for women’s rights movements. On the
other hand, there are those who claim that Is-
lam treats women as second class people (Ar-
sel, 1987; Calislar, 1991). For example, male
superiority is endorsed by Islamic law on fam-
ily matters and inheritance. The fact that Ko-
ran is Allah’s words legitimizes women’s posi-
tion as subordinate and inferior, since it would
not be possible to challenge divine judgement.
Islam provides the infrastructure for keeping
women off the public sphere, equal or not;
what is certain in Islam is that women are sep-
arated from (i.e., excluded from public sphere)
men’s realm.
According to Mernissi (1975), women were
confined to their homes—excluded from the
public sphere—because they have the poten-
tial power to upset the social order.
 
In Islam there is no belief in female inferior-
ity. On the contrary, the whole system is
based on the assumption that women are
powerful and dangerous beings. All sexual
institutions (polygamy, repudiation, sexual
segregation, etc.) can be perceived as a strat-
egy for containing their power. (Mernissi,
1975, p. 19)
 
A woman in the public sphere is a threat to so-
cial order because she carries with herself the
danger of 
 
fitna
 
—her ability to create chaos
through her sexual attraction (Al-Hibri, 1982;
Arsel, 1987; Göle, 1991; Ilyasoglu, 1994; Mer-
nissi, 1975). For example, in the Ottoman Em-
pire—from 1299 to its collapse in 1923—female
behavior was determined and scrutinized
through the triple coalition of state, religion,
and family. The administration (i.e., the Pal-
ace), issued decrees stating the days of the
week that women can go outside their homes
and the proper form of clothing they should
wear while outside. Such issues as the thick-
ness of the veil covering the face, the proper
length of the chaddur were decided by the
state authority and broadcast through the de-
crees of the Sultan.
Covering oneself up is a sexual concept,
women veil themselves because their faces,
bodies, hair, and voice attract men; thus, Islam
views woman only in terms of sexuality and
not as part of humanity. Humanity is male and
it has to be protected from the female. The im-
portance to order of veiled women in Turkish
society is evident in the clash between the
modernizing and traditional tendencies.
 
Women’s clothing, veils, slaves and polyg-
amy were all themes that occupied a para-
doxical place in the debate on the westerniz-
ing of Turkey at the end of the 19th century.
These cultural particularities of Turkish life
did not fit into the modernizing plans of the
pro-Western elites who contemplated Tur-
key through the gaze of Europeans. But at
the same time, it would seem that the Turk-
ish or Ottoman identity lay almost entirely in
these cultural traits, as if a great part of
Turkish identity was tied to these traditional
ways. (Seni, 1995, p. 25)
 
At the end of the 20th century, the debate in
Turkey still continues over the extent to which
women can reveal their bodies and participate
in public life without upsetting public order. In
the 1990s, as a result of the increasing strength
of political Islam in Turkey, one observes a re-
versal to Islamic dress and to Islamic rules for
gender roles. An interesting example of the
relevance of the debate to modern Turkish life
is the dispute in January 1998 as to whether
women can pray along with men at funeral ser-
vices or whether the presence of women in the
crowd would jeopardize the integrity of men’s
prayers.
 
2
 
 The proponents of the Islamic tradi-
tion are adamant that women have no place
among men in public prayers, and that the
presence of women upsets the general order. It
is for this reason that, even when properly
 Turkish Women’s Predicament 307
 
veiled, women in modern Turkey are still
physically separated among the pro-Islamic,
traditional groups from men in all gatherings.
 
Kemalism
 
The third agent of oppression in Turkey,
paradoxically, is Kemalist ideology. In contrast
to Islamic premises, Kemalist ideology aims at
integrating women into Turkish public life.
When the new Turkish republic was founded
in 1923 on the ashes of the Ottoman Empire,
the founder, Mustafa Kemal Atatürk strove to
create a modern state. The emancipation of
women was found to be critical in this en-
deavor.
The first step toward emancipation was
marked by changes in dress codes. The Kemal-
ist reforms of dress eliminated the curse of sex-
uality from Turkish women by forbidding the
use of veil and chaddur. Through the dress re-
forms of 1925, the Islamic way of dressing was
abandoned in favor of Western attire. Second,
the Civil Code of 1926 eliminated the Islamic
rules for marriage even though it still de-
pended upon male dominance for the survival
of the family as a social institution. The new
Civil Code forbade polygamy—under Islamic
laws of marriage, a man is entitled to four
wives and can divorce any one of the wives
himself. The Civil Code introduced gender
equality in marriage, divorce, and in matters of
inheritance, and granted equal child custody
rights for both parents. Third, in 1930, Turkish
women were granted the right to vote in local
elections and in 1934, the right to vote for and
to be elected to public office in national elec-
tions, rather early even when compared to
their European sisters. These reforms during
the early years of the Turkish Republic brought
legal equality for women, at least on paper. As
a consequence, women became staunch allies
of the Kemalist regime, which granted them
rights and liberties. Women’s rights became
part of the process of modernization and secu-
larization (Arat, 1989; Kandiyoti, 1987; Tekeli,
1995). During the early years of the Turkish
Republic, “most of the feminists have become
militant ‘Kemalists’ and for the prominent
women of this generation ‘feminism’ and ‘Ke-
malism’ became synonyms” (Tekeli, 1986, p. 193).
One should note that even though Kemal-
ism had highly improved women’s lot in Turk-
ish society, the integration of women into public
sphere was possible only if women concealed
their femininity and displayed modesty in their
attire and behavior. The ideal woman is por-
trayed as pure, honorable, and unreachable,
serving the higher cause of modernization in
Turkey. In that manner, Turkish women are
seen as self-sacrificing, sacred creatures whose
integration into public sphere as teachers,
nurses, and professionals does not threaten
morality or order. The price for female free-
dom in this early republican era in Turkey was
the suppression of female femininity, thus visi-
bility. Islamic practice controls women’s visi-
bility—their potential to threaten public or-
der—by separating private and public spheres
and by veiling women. Kemalism, on the other
hand, controls their visibility by developing a
stereotype of a Turkish woman; modest in ap-
pearance, companion to her male in moderniz-
ing the country. In that aspect, Islam and Ke-
malism were similar in that both depended
upon the notion that women constituted a
threat to the social order. Islam dealt with that
threat by confining women to their houses and
Kemalism dealt with that threat by stripping
women of their sexuality and by putting forth
asexual stereotypes that typified the new
Turkish woman.
 
The Leftist Ideology
 
The Leftist ideology, dominant in Turkish
politics, especially among the modernizing
forces in Turkish society, from 1965 to 1980, is
another ideology that tried to strip women of
their sexuality. In this manner, the Leftist ide-
ology treated the female question in Turkey in
a similar manner to Kemalism and Islam. The
Turkish Left took upon itself the liberation of
all the Turkish people and it did not handle
women as a separate category. The “female
problem” was perceived to be one of the nu-
merous ailments of the Turkish bourgeoisie or
the capitalist development in Turkey. The
Turkish Left consisted of the Republican Peo-
ple’s Party, Communist Party, Turkish Work-
ers Party, trade unions, as well as student orga-
nizations in various universities. Even though
all these groups had varying levels of commit-
ment to a “socialist revolution,” they con-
verged around the notion that feminism is a
bourgeois phenomenon, blocking the way to
societal salvation (Sirman, 1989; Taylor, 1983)
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During the 1970s, the Turkish Left focused on
women’s rights as part of a systemic social
transformation. “The Turkish Left has tradi-
tionally ascribed the oppression of women to
the socio-economic backwardness of a country
said to be dominated by feudal relations”
(Berktay, 1995, p. 251) Women were included
in the Leftist movements as comrades and
asexual beings, reminding one of the Islamic
argument that women constitute a threat to
the public order. It would be interesting to
note that women working side-by-side with
men are called 
 
baci
 
—sister, thus eliminating
the threat of sexuality. The Turkish Left has
used this terminology extensively to “denote
an unsexed, depersonalized kind of ‘woman
comrade’” (Berktay, 1995, p. 252). Tansu Cil-
ler, the leader of the conservative, right wing
True Path Party, who was the Prime Minister
from June 1993 to January 1996 and Deputy
Prime Minister until June 1997, refers to her-
self as 
 
baci
 
 when she appeals to the masses in
an attempt to desexualize herself and be taken
seriously as a politician.
To sum up, despite many improvements
that the process of modernization and Kemal-
ist reforms brought to women’s rights in Tur-
key, the basics of male domination stayed in-
tact. Left unacknowledged and untreated both
by Kemalism and by the leftist ideology, the
oppression of women in Turkey has not re-
ceived the attention it had in Western societ-
ies. The patriarchal order persisted under a
different cover. The legal equality granted by
Kemalist reforms did not achieve the emanci-
pation of women in Turkey. As Simone de
Beauvoir (1953) pointed out: “Even when her
rights are legally recognized in the abstract,
long-standing custom prevents their full ex-
pression in the mores” (p. 10). This has been
the situation in Turkey, even though Kemalist
reforms took a drastic step toward women’s
emancipation.
In the 1990s, one witnesses a step backward
toward Islamic practices. The popular support
for pro-Islamic political party—Welfare/Virtue
Party
 
3
 
—has increased steadily since 1987. In
the 1987 local elections, RP received 18.4% of
the votes and in the 1995 general elections, it
received 21.7% of the national vote (Müftüler-
Bac, 1998). Thus, Islam has become a major force
to be reckoned with in Turkish society and pol-
itics. Its implications for the status of women is
that militants of political Islam are demanding
application of Islamic practices and Islamic law
to women and family matters. The 1990s are
witnessing the emergence of Islamic women as
an important civil society movement. (Göle,
1991; Ilyasoglu, 1994) The paradox is that these
women are in the public sphere but they live in
the Islamic way. For example, there is a grow-
ing number of girls who are seeking education
and employment but who wear the veil. These
women, who mostly support the pro-Islamic
Welfare/Virtue Party, follow the Islamic way
of living but work for the Party. As Islam polit-
icized in the 1980s, women came forth as mili-
tant activists, the veiled women became the
symbol of activism for political Islam, while at
the same time, they constituted the boundary
line between Islamists and secular Western-
ists.
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 One possible explanation for being out-
side yet veiling oneself is, of course, political.
But, there is another side to the story. These
women shield themselves from male harass-
ment by their Islamic dress; their veil gives
them space in the public sphere without being
threatened by men. The veil in modern Turkey
works as a protective shield against being la-
beled as fair game or a sexual being if and
when women are outside their domestic space.
Thus, the veiled woman in Turkey in the
1990s could be considered to be a reaction to
male dominance. It has been developed as a
defense mechanism by those women who no
longer want to be contained in their traditional
realm, the house; but who feel threatened by
men. For some, these women veil themselves
because they are “hostile to the message of the
feminist ideology” (Tekeli, 1986, p. 194). This
may be true to a certain extent. However, the
trend may be toward an opposite direction,
that these “Islamic” women may be using the
traditional dress as a weapon in order to se-
cure themselves in the public sphere without
being subject to male harassment. It seems,
therefore, too simplistic to claim Islam the
only culprit of women’s oppression in Turkey.
One should note, however, that one common
denominator for all social groups in Turkey,
whether Islamists, Kemalists, or Leftists, is that a
woman’s value is determined by her sexual pu-
rity, which is addressed in the next section.
 
NAMUS: SEXUAL PURITY
 
In Turkey, woman’s chastity remains the most
important control mechanism over female
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freedom. Such social institutions as the family,
the courts, and cultural traditions constitute
the backbone of this control mechanism. The
reflection of female chastity in modern Turk-
ish society is 
 
namus
 
, family honor that exists in
varying degrees in other Mediterranean societ-
ies. 
 
Namus
 
 can be roughly translated to sexual
purity. Kandiyoti reflects on sexual purity as
another form of control over female behavior.
 
The corporate control over female sexuality
becomes strikingly evident in the large num-
ber of different individuals who see them-
selves as immediately responsible for ensur-
ing women’s appropriate sexual conduct . . .
firmly imprinting the notion that her sexual-
ity is not hers to give or withhold. (Kandi-
yoti, 1987, p. 325)
 
One aspect of sexual purity for women is that
premarital and extramarital affairs are strictly
forbidden. The basic difference between Turk-
ish society and European societies is that, in
Turkey, these activities are not personal but
involve state authority. The state in Turkey is a
party to women’s sexual activities reflecting
society’s values vis-à-vis women’s sexual pu-
rity. For example, married women caught in
the act of infidelity receive jail sentences; sin-
gle women caught with a married man may be
subject to virginity tests to determine whether
sexual intercourse has occurred; girls under
state control, such as at state schools, orphan-
ages, and mental hospitals, may be required to
undergo virginity tests. For example, a former
Minister of Health, Yildirim Aktuna, ordered
regular monthly virginity tests for female pa-
tients while he was in charge of the Istanbul
Bakirkoy Mental Hospital (Cindoglu, 1997, p.
257). These are all attempts by the state to
control female sexuality.
Women’s sexual behavior is a measure of
both the society’s and the state’s dominant val-
ues in Turkey. A family’s/men’s honor is at
stake when one of the women of the family is
behaving or is reputed to be behaving in a non-
virtuous manner. Educating females, allowing
them to walk on the streets, letting the girl
choose her own spouse may all have the poten-
tial to threaten 
 
namus.
 
 In different social
classes, ‘namus’ would be jeopardized by dif-
ferent misdemeanors. In middle class, it is only
sexual liaisons that are not tolerated, in lower
middle class, going to the grocery store alone is
unacceptable. What is common to all classes is
that the aim is strict control over female behav-
ior. Even rumors are enough to besmirch the
family honor. 
 
Namus
 
 can only be cleansed—
because it has been dirtied by the woman—by
blood; so the woman has to be killed by one of
the male members of the family. 
 
Namus
 
 mur-
ders are commonplace in Turkey, especially in
groups of lower socioeconomic status. They
are quite separate and distinct from crimes of
passion. A striking example of such a “cleans-
ing process” took place in Southeast Turkey in
April 1996 when a 13-year-old girl ran from
home and her 14-year-old cousin was ordered
by the family to cleanse the family honor by
killing her. In court, the judge sentenced the
murderer cousin to 2 1/2 years in prison be-
cause of the traditions of the region where the
incident took place.
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Thus, the most important aspect of sexual
purity for women is virginity and chastity. That
is partly because of their value as reproductive
agents. The image of God as Father in mono-
theistic religions is sustained in the patriarchal
and patrilineal social system, which both praises
and preserves male dominance. A woman may
claim a place in the social order only through
her reproductive capacities. Women’s virginity
and chastity are the only guarantees that men
can claim fatherhood; the patriarchal system
controls female promiscuity in order to secure
fatherhood. Judeo-Christian and Islamic pre-
mises legitimized male control of female sexu-
ality for this purpose of legitimate birth.
The modern legal structure in Turkey is
based upon the same concern: the control of
female sexuality. A promiscuous woman is a
danger to the social order created under Islam,
but man’s promiscuity is not controlled, it is
even encouraged. The importance of female
chastity in Turkish social order is best illus-
trated by Serif Mardin (1991), who claims that
from the 17th century onward, female chastity/
morality as epitomized by female clothing and
behavior has been used by religious reaction-
aries and conservatives as basis for urban re-
bellion. 
 
Din elden gidiyor
 
–We are losing our
religion—has been a favorite protest by the re-
ligious conservative reactionaries in order to
express their discontent and opposition to the
modernization efforts. The most visible proof
for the process leading to infidelity was, of
course, women’s morality as measured by their
clothing and behavior. The battleground of
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modernization was women’s bodies and the
most visible form of control over women’s
bodies is their virginity.
The most recent debate over women in
Turkey is whether girls are to be subjected to
virginity tests by the state. Virginity tests and
controls of young girls are generally conducted
on girls suspected of illicit behavior or on
brides who do not bleed on their first night.
The importance of virginity lies in its capacity
to determine the woman’s value in the mar-
riage market and, therefore, her status in soci-
ety. In December 1997, a new law was passed
regarding virginity tests, stating that a girl may
refuse to have such a check; but one should
note that given the social value of virginity, a
girl refusing to be checked would be automati-
cally declaring herself a nonvirgin. “Being a
virgin bride signifies a woman’s purity and her
loyalty to her family. In a sense, the virginity of
the bride is an asset for both her family and the
groom’s family” (Cindoglu, 1997, p. 253). Ac-
cording to one study conducted by the Istanbul
Social Research Foundation, more than 70%
of men interviewed still regard virginity as an
absolute condition in their brides (
 
Report on
Sexuality in Turkey
 
, 1996, p. 37).
Female virginity is definitely not a personal
choice, it involves society—a nonvirgin is faced
with social alienation and marginalization.
What is particular to Turkey is that it also in-
volves the state. The Minister responsible for
Women’s Affairs, Ms. Isilay Saygin, in an in-
terview to a Turkish daily newspaper (
 
Yeni
Yüzyìl
 
, 1998), stated that the Turkish state is
responsible for girls’ virginity and, therefore,
virginity tests should be continued.
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 She based
her arguments on the supremacy of the social
values and protection of the family reflecting
the general attitude of Turkish society regard-
ing virginity. These perceptions, deeply em-
bedded into the collective memory of the
Turkish society, reflect the dominant view of
women as the social and biological carrier of
the community. “Because of their reproductive
capacity, women are seen as the transmitters
of group values and traditions and as agents of
socialization of the young” (Moghadam, 1994,
p. 18). Their sexual purity, therefore, is essen-
tial for the survival of society’s norms and values.
It is, therefore not a major surprise to find
that most of the violence directed against
women stem from 
 
namus
 
-sexual purity con-
cerns. Accordingly, a groom who does not find
his bride a virgin on their first night may kill
the bride, but still escape social alienation for
his act. The fact that most virgins do not neces-
sarily bleed on their first intercourse is mostly
overlooked. The woman who does not bleed
on her first night is either shot or sent back to
her father’s house as damaged goods. The ex-
tended media coverage of murder of women
on account of honor seems to suggest that it is
a common problem, especially in less-devel-
oped regions in Turkey. However, a society
that cannot secure its women’s survival cannot
secure its women’s welfare either.
If the woman escapes violence on her first
night, there is no guarantee that life shall con-
tinue blissfully. There is violence directed
against women, both inside their homes and on
the streets. Wife battering is not uncommon—
a recent report indicates up to 30% of all
women in Turkey are regularly beaten by their
husbands (
 
Report on Domestic Violence
 
, 1995).
A common Turkish saying legitimizes the act
by claiming that “Husbands both love and beat
their wives.”
As for single women, their sexuality poses a
serious threat to social order. Even though a
rank of professional women coexists with men
in the public sphere, men still dominate over
the “liberated” woman in terms of her per-
sonal life. For example, a single woman living
on her own is dangerous to the community in
which she is living, especially in middle-class
neighborhoods. The reason is basically that
she is not abiding the rules set by the male-
dominant system, which requires that she be
married. An unmarried, independent woman
living on her own is regarded as an anomaly.
Thus, even the educated male has a tendency
to view an unmarried, therefore, masterless
woman, as fair game. Ayse Saktanber (1995)
asserts that this tendency reflects the division
of Turkish women into two categories; “those
almost totally devoid of sexuality” (i.e., the
family woman), and “those that are nothing
but sexuality” (Saktanber, 1995, p. 155). This
categorization reminds one of the mother/
whore dichotomy in the West. An event that
took place in Istanbul in May 1998 illustrates
this tendency to view single women as fair
game; in a middle-class neighborhood of Istan-
bul, three models/actresses who lived together
were attacked and gang raped in their own
house by seven men. The media coverage re-
flected the society’s biases that the women
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rather than the aggressors were guilty, because
of their professions and lifestyles.
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In short, woman’s value in the Turkish soci-
ety is measured through her sexual purity,
which is controlled by customs, mores, norms,
and laws. The interplay of Mediterranean cul-
ture and Islamist ideology is the determining
factor for measuring women with respect to
their sexual propriety.
 
TURKISH WOMEN IN STRUGGLE
 
To recall the dichotomy of Turkish women
mentioned above, the modern woman and the
traditional woman, it seems that the common
denominator for all Turkish women is the vari-
ous forms of oppression they face. Rural and
urban women face different problems, as do
women from the urban middle classes and
lower middle classes, but they are all subject to
the rules of patriarchy. The patriarchal system
survives by feeding on the continuity of male
dominance, which is achieved by oppressing
the female population. The most visible woman,
the educated, middle-class, working woman, is
as close as the Turkish woman gets to emanci-
pation. The proportion of this type of woman
to the whole population of women in Turkey is
pretty small; 87.36% of all women in Turkey
are not employed (
 
Report on Domestic Vio-
lence
 
, 1995, pp. 84–85), on the other hand,
roughly 30% of all university professors, medi-
cal doctors, and lawyers are women; so those
who are employed are mostly working in pro-
fessional jobs. In the business sector, the pro-
portions are much lower; for every 100 men at
the executive level, there are 3 women.
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 Eco-
nomic equality is achieved by this small, privi-
leged group, but they are still bound by the
rules of the society in which they are con-
demned to live as proper women. What the
Kemalist reforms have achieved is the integra-
tion of some women into the male-dominated
system; what needs to be done—if equality is
to be achieved—is transform the system itself,
which is the ultimate aim of women’s move-
ments in Turkey.
A feminist movement flourished in the
post-1980 period and became one of the most
important social movements, helping to define
civil society in Turkey. A student of Turkish
politics would be quick to point out that 1980
is the year when the military took over civilian
politics, which resulted in massive political re-
pression. The women’s liberation movement
found fertile ground in that period. In 1983,
abortion was legalized in Turkey with the
Abortion Act. In 1987, a massive campaign
against wife-battering began and a number of
women shelters were opened. Women also be-
gan a campaign against sexual harassment on
the streets or in public places. In 1990, a
Women’s Library and Information Center was
opened in Istanbul for the purpose of dissemi-
nating information on women. In 1991, a Min-
istry of Women’s Affairs was established.
Women’s Day celebrations on March 8 have
attracted media and public attention.
In addition, in the 1990s, women’s move-
ments are trying to eliminate the legal bases of
inequality such as the Civil Code and the Penal
Code. Though it is a major improvement over
the Islamic law, the Civil Code of 1926 still
falls short of gender role egalitarianism. For
example, Article 152 of the Code dictates that
the Head of the Family is the man, Article 153
states that upon marriage woman has to carry
her husband’s last name. (A minor revision in
May 1997 allows women to keep their maiden
name along with their husbands’). Further-
more, the Civil Code states that the Head of
the family is the father (Article 154), thus
overlooking all the families in which the head
can be a single mother; for example, divorced
or widowed mothers with children. These arti-
cles are what women’s movements aim to
modify through legal amendments.
It is not only the Civil Code that perpetu-
ates ties of subordination in Turkey. The Penal
Code also discriminates against women. It is
expected that women are the first target of vio-
lence in all societies, but laws protect women
against such practices by punishing the culpa-
ble. In Turkey, a man who rapes a prostitute
may be entitled to a reduction in his sentence,
and a man who kills his sister, wife, mother,
sister-in-law for her improper actions, is looked
upon as the victim not the victimizer. Raping a
married woman, therefore, not a virgin, has a
lesser sentence than raping an unmarried
woman in Turkey. The best illustration of gen-
der-based legal inequality is 
 
Zina
 
—extramari-
tal sex. 
 
Zina
 
, under the Civil Code, is a cause
for divorce. However, under the Penal Code,
married women accused of 
 
Zina
 
 are punished
with jail sentences, whereas married men com-
mitting the same act of infidelity are not pun-
ished at all. Such patterns of oppression are so
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deeply embedded in the social and legal infra-
structure that few question them or try to elim-
inate them. Fortunately, women’s movements
that campaign against these patterns of op-
pression are increasingly more active in the
1990s; two notable examples are, KADER, a
new movement established in 1997 for the pur-
pose of increasing women’s participation at lo-
cal and national politics; and Purple Roof, a
women’s movement organization that aims at
eliminating violence directed against women
in domestic and public sphere. There are also
organized women’s movements against do-
mestic violence, against legal inequalities
noted above. These feminist movements at-
tract extended media coverage and generate
hostility by the conservative circles.
A good method of keeping women down is
to exclude them from education. In rural areas
and in the lower middle-class neighborhoods
in the cities, families are reluctant to send their
daughters to school, even though it is compul-
sory. The Republican People’s Party con-
ducted a survey on women’s education and the
findings indicated that 8 million Turkish women,
one third of the female population, do not
know how to read and write (
 
Yeni Yüzyìl
 
,
1997a) A recent study by UNICEF revealed
that one out of every three school-aged girl
does not receive any education in Turkey, and
that 30% of all women in Turkey are illiterate
(World Bank Development Report, 1995).
The schooling of girls can be as low as 12% in
certain regions in the rural areas. The reason
for keeping girls out of the schooling process is
that the interplay of the Mediterranean and Is-
lamic tradition keeps girls at home learning
domestic skills from their mothers. Illiteracy
among women leads to worse outcomes, mak-
ing it easier to subordinate these women who
have no training and to keep them under their
fathers, brothers,’ or husbands’ control.
While most girls are kept out of school, ed-
ucation materials are designed in such a man-
ner that they indoctrinate the values and the
rules of patriarchy. Thus, the socialization pro-
cess of children into gender specific roles be-
gins early in the family, but the schooling pro-
cess is also one of the main elements in this
socialization, like in most European countries.
Books in primary and secondary schools por-
tray gender roles in a specific manner and so-
cialize the students into gender roles and re-
sponsibilities. For example, girls are almost
always pictured with the mother, helping her
cook, setting the table, or doing the laundry.
The setting for the female child is always the
domestic scene, while the boys are portrayed
with their father, looking at the newspaper,
watching television, helping with the chores
outside, in short, engaged in “manly” activi-
ties. Journalist Nalan Kuloglu, investigated the
gender roles in secondary school books on reli-
gion and morals, found that in almost all of
them women are either ignored or treated in
terms of their servility and subordination to
men, mostly their husbands. The media and
the daily newspapers in Turkey also contribute
handsomely to this constant socialization. Televi-
sion commercials and soap operas teach wom-
anly behavior and condemn acts such as working
outside the home as unfeminine and destruc-
tive to the happiness of family life. Newspa-
pers provide women’s section on separate
pages titled “For Women,” in which women
are indoctrinated with helpful hints as how to
make themselves better looking, sexually will-
ing, good care takers, good cooks, etc.
The whole system—the family, schooling
and the media—constantly sends one message
to women. A woman’s first duty is to marry as
early as possible and continue her life as a doc-
ile, pleasant wife and a dedicated, sacrificing
mother. This process of socialization into gen-
der roles determines the power relations be-
tween the sexes.
The Foundation of Social Research Cen-
ter’s study on sexuality in Turkey found a clear
correlation between education and gender
roles (
 
Report on Domestic Violence
 
, 1995).
70% of uneducated women considered beating
their daughters a viable way of disciplining
their daughters, whereas only 3% of university
graduate women thought so; 57% of the uned-
ucated women considered that a woman’s
place was at home, and that the woman should
not intervene in man’s business—the saying
goes in Turkish as “With flour in her hands,
she is intervening in man’s business”—
whereas no university graduate woman agreed
with that. It also is more probable that women
university graduates choose their spouses
themselves, whereas the girls in rural areas and
living in traditional settings have no chance of
doing so.
It seems that women suffer from double op-
pression, they do not receive education and
they are kept out of the labor market. Article
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159—revoked in 1991—of the Turkish Civil
Code stated that a woman required her hus-
band’s approval before she takes up employ-
ment. In a society where women ask their hus-
bands’ permission even to go out,
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 let alone
work outside the home, what the law dictates
has less importance. A study conducted by the
Turkish Prime Ministry, Family Research In-
stitution revealed that 40% of all Turkish
women do not work outside the home because
of their husbands’ objections (
 
Report on Do-
mestic Violence
 
, 1995, pp. 120–121). Women
from lower socioeconomic groups are faced
with the inability to participate in labor market
activities because of their lack of education
and lack of skills. The social factors that keep
women at home also serve an economic pur-
pose. Turkey has high unemployment rates,
therefore, the competition by women with
men on the job market is highly undesirable.
The labor force in Turkey is 47.4% of the pop-
ulation, with 69.9% male and 25.2% female;
the unemployment ratio is 6.9%. As for unem-
ployment for educated young people, the ratio
is 25.3% for males and 45.3% for females. Per-
sons not in the labor force comprise 52.6%,
within this group housewives comprise 52.8%,
63.3% of which live in urban areas. It seems,
therefore, that females in urban areas (i.e.,
housewives mostly) are passive in the labor
force (State Institute of Statistics, 1998). On
the other hand, women in rural areas carry
most of the burden for agricultural production;
67.2% of all women in Turkey are employed as
“nonsalaried family workers,” especially in ag-
ricultural production (
 
Yeni Yüzyìl
 
, 1997a). Ac-
cording to the October 1997 Household La-
bour Force Survey conducted by the State
Institute of Statistics (1998), 51% of people
employed in agriculture in Turkey were un-
paid family workers and 71% of these were fe-
male (State Institute of Statistics, 1998). This
means that women are carrying the highest
burden in agricultural production, but do not
receive any return for the value they create. To
illustrate the obstacles women face in the labor
market, one may mention that in the census of
November 30, 1997, the State Statistics Insti-
tute collected information regarding employ-
ment and labor movements from the heads of
the family—overlooking millions of married
women who have jobs themselves, thus, indi-
rectly, the Turkish state was declaring that the
working women have no value to state statis-
tics except as wives. Thus, the mechanisms of
the labor market sustain gender inequality due
to vertical and horizontal segregation.
 
CONCLUSION
 
To sum up, Turkish women are faced with op-
pression despite the Kemalist reforms of the
1920s. The agents of oppression over female
freedom are the Mediterranean culture with
its honor and shame codes, the Islamic tradi-
tion with its divine judgement on female be-
havior and the Kemalist ideology with its ste-
reotype of an asexual, self-sacrificing Turkish
woman.
Despite many reforms that granted Turkish
women legal, social, and political rights in the
1920s, Turkish women are still far off from
emancipation. It is this paradoxical character
of Kemalist reforms that this article tries to
emphasize. The process of Turkish moderniza-
tion provided Turkish women rights, at least
on paper, while it also created the illusion that
Turkish women are emancipated. Consequently,
the educated, professional women, produced
by Kemalist reforms, were not organized un-
der a women’s rights movement until the
1980s, basically because they did not perceive
the ongoing oppression of women in Turkey. It
is this misperception that prevented the emer-
gence of women’s movements and helped sus-
tain the contradiction of “liberated” women.
Women suffer from lack of education, employ-
ment, and opportunities that are sustained by
dominant social norms. Controlled in their
sexuality, kept out of schools, discriminated in
the labor market, Turkish women are still a
long way from emancipation.
The “liberation” of Turkish women has
been one of the best concealed lies in Turkey.
In the 1980s and 1990s, a number of questions
arose as to who Turkish women are. It is
against this background that women’s move-
ments found fertile ground. One should note,
however, that the women’s question is only
one aspect of the deeply buried identity crisis
that Turkey is undergoing in the 1990s.
 
ENDNOTES
 
1. For a detailed analysis of the Mediterranean family
structure, see 
 
Mediterranean Family Structure
 
 (Peris-
tiany, 1976).
2. The issue became politicized in the second week of Jan-
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uary when the Islamists and secular modernizers polar-
ized over the presence of women in public prayers side-
by-side with men. Turkish daily newspapers, 
 
Yeni
Yüzyìl
 
, 
 
Cumhuriyet
 
, 
 
Hurriyet, 
 
and
 
 Zaman
 
 ran editorials
on this issue for 2 days, January 15–16, 1998.
3. The pro-Islamic groups organized under the banner of
the Welfare Party in 1987, which on the December 24,
1995 national elections came out as the first party from
the ballot box. The rise of political Islam created a reac-
tionary movement that consisted of a coalition between
secularist civil servants, military, and the Leftist parties.
The Welfare Party was outlawed in 1998, and its leader,
Necmettin Erbakan, was asked to step down. The out-
lawed Welfare Party is reorganized under a new party
named the Virtue Party since January 1998.
4. There is a similarity here between Turkey and other
Islamic countries, such as Iran, in terms of increased
strength of political Islam and women as its active militants
(Keddie & Hoglund, 1986; Moghissi, 1997; Ptuthi, 1995).
5. For an extended media report of the incident, see Turk-
ish daily newspapers 
 
Milliyet
 
 (1996) and 
 
Zaman
 
 (1996).
The way the incident was reported varied depending on
the ideological orientation of the newspapers; for exam-
ple, the secular-oriented newspapers reported the mur-
der as horrendous, whereas Islamist newspapers, though
they condemn the murder on religious grounds, view the
incident as a result of social degeneration.
6. See the interview with Isilay Saygin published in the
Turkish daily newspaper 
 
Yeni Yüzyìl
 
 (1997b). In that
interview, Ms. Saygin stated that virginity controls are
within the state’s authority and it is up to the state to
DETER young girls from illicit sexual behavior. In that
same interview, she also stated that 
 
Zina
 
—extramarital
sex—should be punished by prison sentences. Her state-
ments caused a major uproar and certain women’s
groups demanded her resignation as a minister of
women’s affairs.
7. See the Turkish daily newspapers 
 
Hurriyet
 
, 
 
Milliyet
 
,
 
Sabah
 
, and 
 
Yeni Yüzyìl
 
, May 7, 8, and 9.
8. “The Reality of Women in Turkey,” reported by Dilek
Gedik (1997).
9.
 
Report on Domestic Violence
 
 (1995) findings show that
64% of all men claim that their wives have to ask for
their permission for such acts as going out of the house,
or wearing a short-sleeved dress.
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